

Message Text

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R 090850Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1914

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 6 VIENNA 2092

FROM US REP MBFR

GENEVA FOR CSCE DELEGATION

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OREP, MCAP, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: AMBASSADOR RESOR'S TESTIMONY BEFORE
RANDALL SUB-COMMITTEE

1. THE AD HOC SUB-COMMITTEE ON US MILITARY COMMIT-
MENTS TO EUROPE OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
HELD HEARINGS IN VIENNA ON MARCH 8 UNDER THE CHAIRMAN-
SHIP OF REPRESENTATIVE RANDALL. OTHER SUB-COMMITTEE
MEMBERS PRESENT WERE CONGRESSMEN STRATTON, WHITEHURST,
JONES AND TREEN. THEY WERE ACCOMPANIED BY COMMITTEE
STAFF MEMBER JOHN FORD. AMBASSADOR RESOR WAS THE
ONLY WITNESS ON MBFR. THE SUB-COMMITTEE ALSO HEARD

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DR. TIMOTHY STANLEY IN CLOSED SESSION. THE HEARINGS

LASTED ABOUT 5-1/2 HOURS.

2. AMBASSADOR RESOR'S OPENING STATEMENT WAS DIVIDED INTO AN UNCLASSIFIED PORTION (PARA 3 / THROUGH PARA 47), AND A CLASSIFIED SECTION (PARA 48 THROUGH PARA 69). THE SUB-COMMITTEE MEMBERS EXPRESSED THEIR APPRECIATION FOR THE PRESENTATION. THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WHICH FOLLOWED APPEAR IN SEPTTEL.

3. THE TEXT OF AMBASSADOR RESOR'S STATEMENT FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN AND COMMITTEE MEMBERS:

LET ME BEGIN BY WELCOMING YOU HERE IN VIENNA. WE APPRECIATE THE INTEREST OF YOUR COMMITTEE IN THE WORK WE ARE DOING, AND I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WITH YOU. WE WISH TO HAVE AN OPEN POLICY WITH CONGRESS THROUGHOUT THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. WE PROPOSE TO GIVE YOU A FRANK AND DETAILED BRIEFING ON THE STATUS OF THE TALKS. AT THE SAME TIME, I WOULD LIKE TO REMIND YOU THAT THESE TALKS ARE CONFIDENTIAL. WE HAVE AGREED WITH THE EAST ON THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THESE TALKS AND BELIEVE IT IS STRONGLY IN OUR INTEREST TO MAINTAIN THIS. WE THINK THIS IS MORE BUSINESS-LIKE; IT AVOIDS PUBLIC POLEMICS AND THUS ENHANCES THE CHANCE OF SUCCESS.

5. IF IT IS AGREEABLE TO YOU, I SHALL FIRST REVIEW THE SITUATION IN MY OPENING STATEMENT, AND THEN I WILL WELCOME YOUR QUESTIONS.

6. THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN ON OCTOBER 30. NINETEEN COUNTRIES ARE PARTICIPATING: 12 NATO AND 7 WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. THE PARTICIPANTS ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO CATEGORIES, DEPENDING ON WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS. THE SO-CALLED DIRECT PARTICIPANTS-- THAT IS, THOSE WHO MAY SIGN ACTURAL AGREEMENTS -- ARE BELGIUM, CANADA, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE WESTERN SIDE. ON THE EASTERN SIDE, THEY ARE: CZECKOSLOVAKIA, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, POLAND, AND THE SOVIET UNION. ALL OF
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THESE COUNTRIES HAVE FORCES OR TERRITORY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS ARE DENMARK, GREECE, ITALY, NORWAY AND TURKEY ON THE WESTERN SIDE, AND BULGARIA, ROMANIA AND HUNGARY ON THE EASTERN SIDE. THESE COUNTRIES DO NOT EXPECT TO BE PARTIES TO ANY MBFR AGREEMENT. HUNGARY IS IN A SOMEWHAT SPECIAL CATEGORY, IN THAT THE ALLIES HAVE RESERVED THE RIGHT TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT HUNGARY WILL BE INCLUDED IN FUTURE DECISIONS, AGREEMENTS OR MEASURES.

7. THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE PRECEDED BY FIVE MONTHS OF PREPARATORY TALKS AMONG REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SAME COUNTRIES LAST YEAR IN VIENNA ON PROCEDURES AND PARTICIPATION FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

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FROM US REP MBFR

GENEVA FOR CSCE DELEGATION

8. THE FIRST TWO DAYS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE DEVOTED TO PRESENTATION OF NATIONAL OPENING STATEMENTS. MOST OF THESE WERE OF A SOMEWHAT GENERAL CHARACTER. HOWEVER, TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS INTO A DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, WE OURSELVES PUT A GREAT DEAL OF SUBSTANCE INTO THE U.S. OPENING STATEMENT.

9. THE SOVIETS RESPONDED ON NOVEMBER 8 BY TABLING AN OUTLINE PROPOSAL OF THEIR OWN.

10. THE ALLIES TABLED A WESTERN FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL ON NOVEMBER 22, HAVING LAID THE GROUNDWORK IN A SERIES OF PRESENTATIONS TO THE EAST OVER THE PRECEDING TWO WEEKS, IN WHICH THEY
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OUTLINED THE NATURE OF THE SECURITY PROBLEM IN CENTRAL EUROPE AS THE ALLIES SEE IT, AND PRESENTED IN GENERAL TERMS THE SOLUTIONS THE ALLIES PROPOSE. SINCE THAT TIME, BOTH SIDES HAVE EXPLAINED AND DEFENDED THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS IN NUMEROUS PRESENTATIONS TO EACH OTHER. THE WEST HAS ALSO PRESENTED CERTAIN ASPECTS OF ITS PROPOSAL IN GREATER DETAIL.

11. THUS, THE TALKS HAVE DEVELOPED INTO A DIALOGUE ON SUBSTANCE MUCH MORE RAPIDLY THAN WE HAD EXPECTED WOULD BE POSSIBLE. BOTH THE WEST AND EAST HAVE DEMONSTRATED A SERIOUS, BUSINESS-LINE ATTITUDE.

12. CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE ALLIES THEMSELVES ARE PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY AND WELL. THE AD HOC GROUP, COMPOSED OF THE ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES IN VIENNA, MEETS DAILY TO DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS, COORDINATE TACTICS VIS-A-VIS THE EAST, DRAFT PLENARY STATEMENTS, AND COORDINATE HANDLING OF THE PRESS.

13. WITH 12 ALLIED COUNTRIES INVOLVED, DIFFERENCES OF VIEWPOINT ON MANY QUESTIONS ARE, OF COURSE TO BE EXPECTED. BUT ANY SUCH DIFFERENCES WHICH ARISE ARE RESOLVED IN A SPIRIT OF ALLIED SOLIDARITY.

14. OUR DELEGATION HERE IS MADE UP OF PERSONNEL SUPPLIED BY THE MAJOR AGENCIES CONCERNED WITH MBFR: THE STATE DEPARTMENT, THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. WE WORK TOGETHER AS A TEAM, AND BECAUSE THE DELEGATION IS DRAWN FROM SUCH A VARIETY OF SOURCES, HAVE AVAILABLE EXPERTISE ON THE ENTIRE RANGE OF TECHNICAL QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

15. THE US AIM IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS THREEFOLD. FIRST, WE SEEK TO ACHIEVE TROOP REDUCTIONS WITH UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, AND IF POSSIBLE WITH ENHANCED STABILITY. BY UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, I MEAN A SITUATION IN WHICH ALLIED LEADERS AND MILITARY ADVISORS HAVE AT LEAST THE SAME DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE ALLIED DEFENSE SITUATION AS THEY DO NOW.

16. SECOND, OUR APPROACH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF SHIFTING A GREATER SHARE OF THE BURDEN TO THE ALLIES SINCE IN THE FIRST
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PHASE ONLY US FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED ON THE WESTERN SIDE.

17. THIRD, WE ARE SEEKING TO REALIZE THESE AIMS IN A MANNER THAT PRESERVES ALLIED UNITY.

18. TO MAKE CLEAR WHAT THE PROBLEMS ARE IN ACHIEVING THESE AIMS, I WOULD LIKE TO OUTLINE THE BASIC FEATURES OF THE MILITARY SITUATION WITH WHICH THESE NEGOTIATIONS DEAL.

19. WE SHOULD FIRST TAKE A LOOK AT THE PRESENT FORCE LEVELS WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IN THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN AREA, THE WARSAW PACT HAS MORE THAN 925,000 GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL, WHILE NATO HAS 777,000. THE WARSAW PACT HAS 15,500 MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN ACTIVE UNITS IN THIS AREA; NATO HAS 6,000.

20. IN PARTICULAR, AS REGARDS THE GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO SUPER-POWERS IN THE AREA, THE SOVIETS HAVE 460,000 SOLDIERS, WHILE THE US HAS 193,000. AS FOR TANKS IN ACTIVE UNITS, THE SOVIETS HAVE 8,600 WHILE THE US HAS 1400.

21. I WOULD LIKE TO ELABORATE A LITTLE ON THE SOVIET FORCES. THE SOVIETS HAVE 360,000 MEN IN 20 DIVISIONS IN EAST GERMANY, 70,000 MEN IN 5 DIVISIONS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 30,000 MEN IN TWO DIVISIONS IN POLAND. THUS, SOVIET SOLDIERS MAKE UP ALMOST HALF OF THE TOTAL PACT GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA. THE BULK OF THESE FORCES ARE DEPLOYED AND STRUCTURED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY COULD LAUNCH AN OFFENSIVE ATTACK ACROSS THE NORTH EUROPEAN PLAIN WITH MINIMAL PREPARATION.

22. THESE FORCES FACE A NATO FORCE WHICH IS ADEQUATE AND COULD GIVE A GOOD ACCOUNT OF ITSELF, BUT WHICH IS STRETCHED THIN.

23. ANOTHER BASIC FACTOR IN THE MILITARY SITUATION IS GEOGRAPHY. THE SOVIET MOBILIZATION BASE IS AS CLOSE AS 650 KILOMETERS FROM THE BORDER OF EAST AND WEST GERMANY. THE US MOBILIZATION BASE IS OVER 5,000 KILOMETERS AWAY.

24. THUS, THERE ARE THREE MAJOR DISPARITIES: THE WARSAW PACT HAS MORE ACTIVE DUTY GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL IN THE AGREED AREA
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OF REDUCTIONS, IT HAS MORE TANKS, AND THE SOVIET UNION IS MUCH CLOSER TO CENTRAL EUROPE THAN THE US. WE REGARD THESE DISPARITIES IN NUMBERS OF MEN, NUMBERS OF TANKS, AND DISTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION

FROM THE AREA AS BASIC TO THE PRESENT SITUATION. THEY ALL WORK TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE WARSAW PACT. AN MBFR AGREEMENT WHICH SIMPLY PRESERVED THESE ADVANTAGES AT A LOWER FORCE LEVEL WOULD BE STRONGLY TO OUR DISADVANTAGE. DISPARITIES CREATE INSTABILITY -- A TEMPTATION TO USE, OR THREATEN TO USE, MILITARY FORCE TO INFLUENCE POLITICAL DECISIONS. OUR GOAL IS, IN FACT, TO ELIMINATE, REDUCE, OR OFFSET THEM IN ANY REDUCTION AGREEMENT.

25. THE BASIC FEATURES OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE REDUCTION AREA SHOULD COMPRISE THE TERRITORIES OF BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, AND POLAND. WE ARE RESERVING OUR POSITION ON HUNGARY.

B. REDUCTION SHOULD BE MADE IN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

C. THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF APPROXIMATE PARITY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN THE FORM OF A COMMON CEILING FOR OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE IN THE REDUCTION AREA, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT COMBAT CAPABILITY. THIS CEILING MIGHT BE SET AT APPROXIMATELY 700,000 SOLDIERS ON EACH SIDE.

D. REDUCTIONS TO THE AGREED COMMON CEILING SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED IN TWO SUCCESSIVE PHASES, GOVERNED BY SEPARATE AGREEMENTS.

E. THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND US GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA.

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FROM US REP MBFR

GENEVA FOR CSCE DELEGATION

F. THE USSR WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE REDUCTION AREA A
TANK ARMY CONSISTING OF FIVE DIVISIONS, INCLUDING ABOUT
68,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS AND 1700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THIS
WOULD BE ABOUT 15 PER-CENT OF THE TOTAL SOVIET GROUND FORCES OF
460,000 SOLDIERS IN THE REDUCTION AREA.

G. THE UNITED STATES WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE REDUCTION
AREA AN APPROXIMATELY EQUAL PROPORTION (15 PER-CENT) OF ITS TOTAL
GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF 193,000 SOLDIERS IN THE REDUCTION
AREA, OR ABOUT 29,000 SOLDIERS. THESE SOLDIERS WOULD BE
WITHDRAWN AS INDIVIDUALS OR IN UNITS, AND THEIR EQUIPMENT
COULD BE STORED AND MAINTAINED IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

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H. IN ANY AGREEMENT REACHED, THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES
FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY
OF THE FLANK COUNTRIES.

I. AGREEMENT SHOULD ALSO BE REACHED ON MEASURES WHICH
WILL BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND ENHANCE STABILITY BY
REDUCING FEAR OF SURPRISE ATTACK AND THE RISK OF MISUNDER-
STANDINGS, PROVIDE FOR VERIFICATION OF AGREEMENTS, AND ENSURE
THAT AGREEMENTS ARE NEITHER FOR VERIFICATION OF AGREEMENTS, AND ENSUR
E
THAT AGREEMENTS ARE NEITHER CIRCUMVENTED NOR UNDERMINED.

J. THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT
ON THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING FOR OVERALL GROUND FORCE
MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE IN THE REDUCTION AREA. IT SHOULD ALSO
INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A
SECOND PHASE, IN WHICH EACH SIDE WOULD AGREE FURTHER TO REDUCE

ITS GROUND FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THE SECOND PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD PROVIDE FOR COMPLETION OF THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS THE AGREED COMMON CEILING.

26. WE BELIEVE THIS A REASONABLE AND PRACTICAL PROPOSAL.

27. WE THINK IT IS PRACTICAL BECAUSE IT DOES NOT ATTEMPT TO TACKLE THE WHOLE POTENTIAL RANGE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER ALL AT ONCE. IT FOCUSES ON US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTION IN THE FIRST PHASE.

28. WE THINK IT IS A REASONABLE PROPOSAL BECAUSE THE OUTCOME IS AN EQUITABLE ONE FOR BOTH SIDES, AND ONE WHICH WOULD ENHANCE STABILITY IN THE AREA. UNDER A COMMON CEILING, BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE THE SAME NUMBER OF SOLDIERS IN THE AREA. WE THINK REDUCTIONS TO 700,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE IS AN ATTAINABLE GOAL.

29. OUR PROPOSAL DEALS WITH THE MAJOR DISPARITIES IN MANPOWER, TANKS, AND GEOGRAPHY. THE MANPOWER DISPARITY WOULD DISAPPEAR AT A COMMON CEILING OF 700,000 SOLDIERS ON EACH SIDE. THE TANK DISPARITY WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY
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REDUCED BY THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOVIET TANK ARMY. AND, THE ASYMMETRY OF THE PROPOSAL REGARDING WITHDRAWAL OF US SOLDIERS AND DISPOSITION OF U.S. EQUIPMENT IS JUSTIFIED BY THE GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITY.

30. WE RECOGNIZE THAT WE ARE ASKING THE EAST TO MAKE BIGGER REDUCTIONS THAN OURSELVES. SO, WE DON'T EXPECT IT WILL BE EASY TO GET SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PROPOSAL. WE THINK, THOUGH, THAT BY FOCUSING ON THE DESIRABILITY OF OBTAINING A GOOD OUTCOME-- THAT IS, A MORE STABLE BALANCE-- WE CAN BRING THE SOVIETS TO SEE THAT OUR APPROACH IS FAIR AND REASONABLE, AND WOULD ACTUALLY LEAD TO AN OUTCOME THAT WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF ALL.

31. WE HAVE ALSO POINTED OUT TO THE SOVIETS IN A LOW-KEY WAY THAT WE SEE MBFR AS A PART OF THE TOTAL PICTURE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. WE THINK THE RUSSIANS ARE SERIOUS ABOUT WANTING TO IMPROVE THEIR OVERALL RELATIONS WITH US, AND FOR THAT REASON, IF FOR NO OTHER, WE THINK THEY WILL MAKE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO FIND COMMON GROUND WITH US IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL.

32. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TABLED ON NOVEMBER 8 CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING FEATURES:

A. THE REDUCTION AREA WOULD BE THE SAME AS UNDER THE ALLIED PROPOSAL, THOUGH HUNGARY IS FIRMLY EXCLUDED.

B. REDUCTION WILL TAKE PLACE IN THREE PHASES.

C. IN THE FIRST PHASE, TO BE CARRIED OUT IN 1975, EACH SIDE WOULD REDUCE BY 20,000.

D. IN THE SECOND PHASE, TO BE CARRIED OUT IN 1976, EACH SIDE WOULD REDUCE ITS FORCES BY 5 PERCENT.

E. IN THE THIRD PHASE, TO BE CARRIED OUT IN 1977, EACH SIDE WOULD REDUCE ITS FORCES BY ANOTHER 10 PERCENT.

F. ALL TYPE OF FORCES WOULD BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTION: GROUND FORCES, AIR FORCES, AND WEAPONS,
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INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

G. EACH OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE THE SAME PROPORTION OF ITS FORCES IN EACH PHASE. THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE BELGIUM, CANADA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, EAST GERMANY, WEST GERMANY, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, POLAND, SOVIET UNION, UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES.

H. REDUCTIONS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN UNITS.

I. FOREIGN FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN WITH THEIR EQUIPMENT TO THEIR HOMELANDS; NATIONAL FORCES WOULD BE DISBANDED, AND THEIR EQUIPMENT DESTROYED OR CONVERTED TO CIVILIAN USE.

J. FOLLOWING REDUCTION, THERE WOULD BE A CEILING ON EACH CATEGORY OF FORCES AND EQUIPMENT.

33. THERE ARE A GREAT MANY DIFFICULTIES IN THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FROM A WESTERN POINT OF VIEW.

34. IT ASSUMES THAT THE EXISITNG FORCE RELATIONSHIP IS SATISFACTORY, WHEREAS THE WESTERN PROPOSAL SEEKS TO IMPROVE UPON THE EXISITNG SITUATION.

35. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOCUSES ON THE REDUCTIONS RATHER THAN THE OUTCOME. THUS, THE EASTERN SIDE ARGUES FOR EQUITY OF REDUCTIONS, WHEREAS THE WESTERN SIDE ARGURES FOR EQUITY OF RESULT.

36. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL IGNORES THE DISPARITIES. THE

EQUAL-QUANTITY AND EQUAL-PERCENTAGE FORMULAE WOULD PRESERVE
EXISTING RATIOS, AND TERMS OF ACTUAL CAPABILITIES, IT WOULD
MAGNIFY THE EFFECTS OF EXISTING DISPARITIES. SINCE THE SOVIET
POTENTIAL TO REINFORCE FROM THE USSR WOULD NOT BE REDUCED,
SUCH REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY WOULD HAVE GREATER WEIGHT IN THE
MILITARY SITUATION AS EXISTING FORCES WERE CUT.

37. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE THE FORCES OF ALL THE
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN EACH PHASE WOULD COMPLICATE THE
NEGOTIATIONS. THE PROPOSED WESTERN FOCUS ON REDUCTION OF
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FROM US REP MBFR

GENEVA FOR CSCE DELEGATION

US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE FIRST PHASE WOULD MAKE THE NEGOTIATIONS FAR MORE MANAGEABLE. IT WILL BE EASIER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES THAN ON THEIR REDUCTION. MOREOVER, IT IS APPROPRIATE FOR THE US AND USSR, WITH THEIR SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES, TO TAKE THE FIRST STEP.

38. SIMILARLY, THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES IN EACH STAGE, AS WELL AS GROUND FORCES, WOULD GREATLY COMPLICATE THE NEGOTIATIONS. DIFFICULT PROBLEMS OF COMPARABILITY WOULD ARISE. MOREOVER, REDUCTION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA WOULD STILL LEAVE UNTOUCHED LARGE SOVIET THEATER
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CAPABILITIES LOCATED CLOSE TO, BUT OUTSIDE, THE REDUCTION AREA. FINALLY, AIRCRAFT WITHDRAWN FROM THE AIR COULD RETURN RAPIDLY; THEIR REDUCTION ON AN AREA BASIS IS NOT, THEREFORE, VERY MEANINGFUL.

39. THE SOVIETS HAVE PROPOSED AN ESSENTIALLY SYMBOLIC CUT IN THE FIRST PHASE. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL ENVISAGES A FIRST STEP WHICH WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN THE EXISTING SITUATION, BECAUSE IT WOULD SHAPE THE REDUCTIONS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENHANCE STABILITY. AND, BECAUSE REDUCTIONS THEMSELVES WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY OTHER MEASURES DESIGNED TO ENHANCE STABILITY AND MUTUAL CONFIDENCE.

40. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT ALL PARTIES ON EACH SIDE REDUCE ALL TYPES OF FORCES IN UNITS IS IN FACT EXTREMELY COMPLEX AND UNCLEAR, GIVEN THE LARGE VARIATIONS IN SIZE, STRUCTURE, ETC., AMONG THE FORCES CONCERNED.

41. FINALLY, THE EASTERN PROPOSAL MAKES NO PROVISION FOR VERIFICATION OR STABILIZING MEASURES.

42. WHILE US WITHDRAWALS UNDER THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WOULD APPROXIMATE US WITHDRAWALS UNDER PHASE I OF THE ALLIED PROGRAM, THE EASTERN REDUCTION PROPOSAL CALLS FOR A TOTAL ALLIED REDUCTION IN GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER (166,000) MORE THAN TWICE THE SIZE OF THE REDUCTION IN GROUND FORCES ONLY CALLED FOR IN THE ALLIED PROPOSAL (77,000). THE DIFFERENCE IS IN EUROPEAN NATO FORCES, LARGELY THE BUNDESWEHR.

43. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL PROVIDES FOR TOTAL EASTERN REDUCTIONS OF GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER OF 189,000. THIS IS SOMEWHAT LESS THAN THE SIZE OF THE REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES ONLY CALLED FOR

UNDER THE ALLIED APPROACH (225,000).

44. WE CANNOT FORESEE IN DETAIL AT THIS POINT HOW THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL GO. CERTAIN THINGS ARE, HOWEVER, EVIDENT AT THIS STAGE.

45. BOTH SIDES ARE SERIOUS.

46. WE ARE FURTHER ADVANCED INTO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS
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WITH THE OTHER SIDE, THAN WE HAD EXPECTED TO BE AT THIS TIME. BOTH SIDES HAVE TABLED PROPOSALS AND ARE NOW ENGAGED IN SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS OF SUBSTANCE.

47. AS REGARDS THE SUBSTANCE, IT IS CLEAR THE POSITIONS ARE FAIRLY FAR APART ON CERTAIN ASPECTS. HOWEVER, WE ARE ONLY AT THE OUTSET OF NEGOTIATIONS. WE BELIEVE WE HAVE A LOGICAL AND PERSUASIVE CASE, AND THAT WE CAN BRING THE EAST TO ACCEPT MANY ASPECTS OF IT.

48. MR. CHAIRMAN, IF IT IS AGREEABLE TO YOU AND THE MEMBERS OF YOUR SUB-COMMITTEE, I SHOULD NOW LIKE TO CONTINUE MY STATEMENT UNDER THE SECRET CLASSIFICATION.

49. I SHOULD LIKE TO MENTION A PROCEDURAL PRACTICE THAT GIVES STRIKING EVIDENCE OF ALLIED COHESION. OUR FORMAL STATEMENTS, OF WHICH THERE HAVE BEEN 19 SO FAR PRESENTED IN PLENARY SESSIONS, ARE JOINTLY DRAFTED. MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, THIS PROCESS IS WELL UNDER WAY, OR EVEN COMPLETED, BEFORE THE AD HOC GROUP SELECTS THE ALLIED REPRESENTATIVE WHO WILL DELIVER IT. HENCE IT IS A GENUINE EXPRESSION OF A UNIFIED ALLIED POSITION.

50. WHILE WE HAVE UNTIL VERY RECENTLY HELD TO A PATTERN OF TWO PLENARIES A WEEK, THE AD HOC GROUP MEETS THREE TO FIVE TIMES A WEEK TO COORDINATE ITS POSITIONS. IN THE COURSE OF THE INFORMAL CONTACTS I MENTIONED EARLIER, THE SOVIETS HAVE REPEATEDLY SOUGHT TO ENTER INTO A SPECIAL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AMERICAN DELEGATION. WE HAVE REJECTED CONSISTENTLY THESE EFFORTS, BEING FULLY AWARE THAT TO DO SO WOULD AROUSE THE SUSPICIONS OF OUR ALLIES AND POSSIBLY DESTROY ALLIED UNITY, HOWEVER, A NEED DOES EXIST IN A CONFERENCE OF THIS SIZE FOR SOME SMALLER AND MORE INFORMAL DEVICE THAN PLENARIES FOR EXCHANGING VIEWS ON AN AUTHORITATIVE BASIS WITH THE OTHER SIDE IF PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE. HENCE WE HAVE JUST BEGUN A SYSTEM OF INFORMAL EAST-WEST MEETINGS WITH THREE DELEGATIONS ON EACH SIDE FOR PURPOSES OF EXPLORING IN GREATER DEPTH THE RESPECTIVE VIEWPOINTS ON PARTICULAR ISSUES ON A NON-COMMITTAL

BASIS. THE US AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES ARE ALWAYS PRESENT AT THESE MEETINGS; ON THE ALLIED SIDE, THE AD HOC GROUP

SELECTS TWO OTHER MEMBERS ON A ROTATING BASIS. NATURALLY, MORE
WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE IN THESE SESSIONS THAN THE AGREED
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ARRANGEMENTS PERMIT. I WOULD LIKE TO
EMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS A VERY SENSITIVE MATTER VIS-A-VIS
THE EASTERN SIDE BUT EVEN MORE SO AMONG OUR ALLIES, HENCE I TRUST
THAT THE CLASSIFICATION OF THIS INFORMATION WILL BE RESPECTED. I
SHOULD LIKE TO EQUALLY STRESS THE FACT THAT ALL STATEMENTS MADE BY
ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES ON THESE OCCASIONS ARE GIVEN FULL AD
HOC GROUP APPROVAL BEFOREHAND, AND THE COMPLETE RESULTS OF THE
EXCHANGES REPORTED BACK TO THE GROUP. THESE INFORMAL MEETINGS HAVE
ALREADY BEGUN TO PROVIDE IMPORTANT CLARIFICATIONS. IN THEM, EACH
SIDE HAS SPOKEN WITH A FRANKNESS AND A DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY
NOT POSSIBLE IN THE LARGE, FORMAL PLENARY MEETINGS. IT REMAINS TO BE
SEEN TO WHAT EXTENT WE CAN USE THESE SESSIONS TO STEER THE EAST TO-
WARDS NEGOTIATING ON THE
BASIS OF OUR PROPOSALS. I WOULD SAY THAT IT IS SIMPLY TOO EARLY
TO DETERMINE JUST WHAT THE OUTCOME OF THESE EXCHANGES WILL BE.

51. THE FOLLOWING TABLE SHOWS THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA
OF REDUCTIONS FROM WHICH WE DEVELOPED OUR COMMON NATO POSITION; I
WILL DISTRIBUTE COPIES OF THIS FOR YOUR RECORD RATHER THAN READING IT
OUT:

NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA

NATO	MANPOWER	PERCENTAGE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY	321,000	41 PERCENT
UNITED STATES	193,000	25 PERCENT
NETHERLANDS	70,000	9 PERCENT
BELGIUM	64,000	8 PERCENT
FRANCE	63,000	8 PERCENT
UNITED KINGDOM	62,000	8 PERCENT
CANADA	3,000	.4 PERCENT
LUXEMBOURG	500	---
TOTAL NATO	777,000	100 PERCENT

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15

EUR-25 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11

OMB-01 SAM-01 DRC-01 /162 W

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1918

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 6 VIENNA 2092

FROM US REP MBFR

GENEVA FOR CSCE DELEGATION

WARSAW PACT MANPOWER PERCENTAGE

SOVIET UNION	460,000	50
IN GDR	360,000	
IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA	70,000	
IN POLAND	30,000	
POLAND	219,000	23
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	158,000	17
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	90,000	10
TOTAL WARSAW PACT	925,000	100

THE FOLLOWING DATA GIVES A BREAKDOWN OF THE NUMBER OF MAIN
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BATTLE TANKS IN THE SAME AREA:

NATO	TANKS IN ACTIVE UNITS	PERCENTAGE
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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY	2,800	47
UNITED STATES	1,400	23

OTHERS	1,800	30
TOTAL	6,000	100

WARSAW PACT	TANKS IN	
	ACTIVE UNITS	PERCENTAGE
SOVIET UNION	8,600	55
OTHERS	6,900	45
TOTAL	15,500	100

52. (I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE A MOMENT TO PROJECT FOR YOU TWO CHARTS WHICH SHOW HOW THE PRESENT STRENGTHS OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA WOULD BE AFFECTED BY THE PHASE I AND PHASE II PROPOSALS OF THE ALLIES.)

53. HAVING COVERED THE BASIC POSITION OF BOTH THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPLAIN WHAT IS MEANT IN OUR OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS BY THE TERM "ASSOCIATED MEASURES." AS I MENTIONED EARLIER, WE HAVE BROKEN THESE DOWN INTO SO-CALLED STABILIZING MEASURES, VERIFICATION MEASURES, AND A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION. FIRST, LET ME EXPLAIN WHAT WE MEAN BY STABILIZING MEASURES.

54. WE HAVE PROPOSED FOUR SPECIFIC MEASURES, SO FAR. THESE ARE:

-- NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES INTO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING ROTATIONS;
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-- PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS;

-- LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE, NUMBER AND DURATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS; AND

-- EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MAJOR EXERCISES BY US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

55. IN ADDITION TO THESE MEASURES, ON WHICH WE HAVE MADE SOME DETAILED PROPOSALS, WE HAVE INDICATED TO THE EASTERN SIDE THAT WE EXPECT REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES TO RESULT IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CEILINGS ON US AND SOVIET

GROUND FORCES REMAINING IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. BOTH SIDES WILL NEED TO RESPECT THESE CEILINGS. THIS, IN TURN, WILL REQUIRE LIMITATIONS ON THE ENTRY OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES INTO THE AREA. OF COURSE, BOTH THE US AND USSR WILL WANT TO CONTINUE REPLACING, ROTATING AND EXERCISING THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA. BUT THIS MAY RESULT IN A TEMPORARY EXCESS OF FORCES IN THE AREA FROM TIME TO TIME. TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENCE IN THE CONTINUING VIABILITY OF THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT, THERE WILL THEREFORE HAVE TO BE SPECIFICALLY LIMITED, AGREED EXCEPTIONS TO RESIDUAL US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE LEVELS.

56. THUS, STABILIZING MEASURES HAVE A PRACTICAL RATIONALE. APPLYING, AS THEY DO, TO US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES, THEY ARE CLOSELY RELATED TO THE REDUCTIONS WE HAVE PROPOSED. MORE THAN THAT, WE ALSO BELIEVE THEY WOULD CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO GREATER STABILITY AND MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. IN EFFECT, THE PACKAGE OF MEASURES WE HAVE PROPOSED WOULD ESTABLISH A SET OF RULES FOR MILITARY BEHAVIOR. THEY ARE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A STABLE, PREDICTABLE PATTERN OF MILITARY BEHAVIOR IN NORMAL PEACETIME CONDITIONS. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, WE CAN MORE EASILY IDENTIFY AND INVESTIGATE ANY ACTIVITY WHICH, BEING ABNORMAL, COULD BE INTERPRETED AS PROVOCATIVE OR DESTABILIZING. THE EASTERN SIDE HAS NOT SHOWN MUCH INTEREST IN THESE MEASURES YET, BUT WE HOPE TO BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR USEFULNESS.

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57. A FURTHER "ASSOCIATED MEASURE" WILL BE AGREED MEANS OF VERIFYING THAT THE TERMS OF THE REDUCTION AGREEMENTS ARE BEING CARRIED OUT. WE WILL INSIST IN THE FIRST INSTANCE THAT THE TWO SIDES UNDERTAKE NOT TO INTERFERE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION; WE MUST RETAIN THIS ESSENTIAL CAPABILITY. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO SUPPLEMENT SUCH AN UNDERTAKING BY AGREEMENT ON OVERT MONITORING OF BOTH THE REDUCTIONS AND THE SUBSEQUENT CEILINGS. WE HAVE NOT YET PRESENTED TO THE EASTERN SIDE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR VERIFICATION MEASURES. THE SOVIET UNION HAS, OF COURSE, TRADITIONALLY BEEN SUSPICIOUS OF VERIFICATION BY INSPECTION. IT WILL NOT BE EASY, THEREFORE, IF IT PROVES POSSIBLE AT ALL, TO GAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THIS IN MBFR.

58. FINALLY, WE HAVE SPOKEN OF PROVISIONS TO INSURE AGAINST CIRCUMVENTION OF THE REDUCTION AGREEMENTS; AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND IN GUARDING AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOVIET BUILD-UP IN HUNGARY. HOWEVER, THIS ASPECT IS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION IN NATO, AND WE HAVE NOT AS YET ADVANCED ANY PROPOSALS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

59. MR CHAIRMAN, I HAVE SOUGHT TO GIVE YOU AN OUTLINE OF THE

NEGOTIATING SITUATION AS IT PRESENTLY EXISTS IN VIENNA, INCLUDING THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES. NOW I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE A MOMENT TO IDENTIFY SOME OF THE PARTICULAR PROBLEM AREAS THAT WILL BE OF IMPORTANCE AS WE PROCEED. THESE ARE NOT IN ANY PARTICULAR ORDER OF PRIORITY.

60. FIRST LET ME SPEAK OF THE ATTITUDES OF OUR PARTICIPATING EUROPEAN ALLIES. THEY HAVE FROM THE BEGINNING DISPLAYED AN ATTITUDE OF CAUTION ABOUT MBFR. IN VIEW OF THE CONCURRENT DEVELOPMENT OF BILATERAL US AND SOVIET RELATIONS, WE CAN PROBABLY NEVER ENTIRELY ERASE AN UNDERLYING ELEMENT OF ANXIETY THAT THE TWO SUPER-POWERS MIGHT SOMEHOW MAKE A DEAL OVER THE HEADS OF THE ALLIES. HOWEVER, THEY ARE ALL AWARE OF CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURES FOR EARLY

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 EUR-25 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11

OMB-01 SAM-01 DRC-01 /162 W
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R 090850Z MAR 74
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1919
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 6 OF 6 VIENNA 2092

FROM US REP MBFR

GENEVA FOR CSCE DELEGATION

US TROOP REDUCTION, AND SEE OUR TWO-PHASE REDUCTION PROPOSAL IN THIS LIGHT. FINALLY, FORCE REDUCTIONS, WHICH MIGHT BE VIEWED SOMEWHAT ABSTRACTLY FROM THE UNITED STATES, IS A MATTER VERY CLOSE TO HOME FOR THEM - A SENSITIVE AND VITAL ISSUE AFFECTING THEIR VERY SURVIVAL. WE MUST KEEP QUIETLY IN MIND, TOO, - ALTHOUGH THIS ASPECT DOES NOT OPENLY SURFACE IN OUR RELATIONS HERE - THAT MANY OF OUR ALLIES DO NOT ENJOY THE MOST STABLE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATIONS AT HOME. A NUMBER HAVE ONLY MINORITY GOVERNMENTS, AND ALL ARE BESET BY ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. THIS IS NOT PARTICULARLY CONDUCTIVE TO BOLD MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY. AND IT PROBABLY MEANS THAT ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WILL BE RELUCTANT TO TAKE ANY CONCLUSIVE POSITIONS REGARDING REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II UNTIL THEY HAVE A CLEARER

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VIEW OF THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF PHASE I NEGOTIATIONS.

61. TO MEET THESE CONCERNS WE HAVE BEEN LEANING OVER BACKWARDS TO PRESERVE NATO UNITY AND TO WORK AS A LOYAL MEMBER OF THE ALLIED TEAM. WE WILL NO DOUBT CONTINUE TO ENCOUNTER RESERVATIONS AND HESITATIONS AS BASIC ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE PHASE II REDUCTIONS COME CLOSER UPON US. WE HAVE AHEAD OF US IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS SOME VERY HARD BARGAINING WITH THE EAST, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH WE MAY WELL HAVE TO RECONSIDER CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN THE ALLIED POSITION. SINCE THIS POSITION IS ITSELF THE PRODUCT OF A LONG AND COMPLEX BARGAINING PROCESS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, AND CONTAINS COMPROMISES ON SENSITIVE ISSUES, RE-OPENING SOME OF THESE ISSUES UNDER THE PRESSURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL CERTAINLY PUT STRAINS ON ALLIED UNITY. BUT FROM THE SPIRIT OF SOLIDARITY THAT HAS BEEN DISPLAYED SO FAR, AND THROUGH THE MUTUAL RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER'S PARTICULAR NEEDS, I AM CONVINCED WE CAN OPERATE FROM A COMMON POLICY TO THE END OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

62. A CONCERN HAS EMERGED AMONG THE EUROPEAN ALLIES REGARDING THE POSSIBLE EFFECT OF MBFR ON FUTURE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION. THIS CONCERN WAS AGGRAVATED BY THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT WHICH, BY CALLING FOR COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS, WOULD HAVE THEREBY PLACED SEPARATE PERMANENT CEILINGS ON THE NATIONAL FORCES OF EACH PARTICIPANT. THIS COULD PREJUDICE THE POSSIBILITY FOR SOME KIND OF WEST EUROPEAN DEFENSE ENTITY. WE AGREE WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES THAT THE EASTERN EFFORT MUST BE RESISTED.

63. WE HAVE SEEN A PERSISTENT WARSAW PACT EFFORT TO SINGLE OUT THE FORCES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT. THE EASTERN SIDE HAS INSISTED THAT THE ARMED FORCES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC EITHER BE INCLUDED IN PHASE I REDUCTIONS, OR A STRONG COMMITMENT BE MADE FOR THEIR INITIAL LIMITATION AND EARLY REDUCTION. THE GERMANS HAVE REFUSED TO BE SINGLED OUT FOR

SPECIAL CONSIDERATION WITHIN EUROPE, FEARING THAT THIS MIGHT LEAD TO A DIRECT SOVIET VOICE IN THE MILITARY AFFAIRS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC.

64. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL TO DIVIDE THE NEGOTIATIONS INTO TWO SUCCESSIVE PHASES, GOVERNED BY SEPARATE REDUCTION AGREEMENTS
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HAS LED TO WHAT IS CALLED THE "LINKAGE" PROBLEM. IN ESSENCE, THE EASTERN NEGOTIATORS ARE ASKING: IF THE REDUCTIONS ARE TO BE CARRIED OUT UNDER TWO SEPARATE AGREEMENTS, WHAT ASSURANCE CAN WE PROVIDE THEM THAT AN AGREEMENT TO REDUCE US AND SOVIET FORCES ONLY WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A SECOND AGREEMENT TO REDUCE NON-US NATO FORCES, AND WHEN WOULD THESE TAKE PLACE? WE HAVE POINTED OUT THAT THE PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD INCLUDE A COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE ON THE SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT, AND WOULD INCLUDE THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING AS THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS - THUS NECESSITATING FURTHER REDUCTIONS. HOWEVER, THE EAST IS NOT YET SATISFIED WITH THIS ANSWER BECAUSE IT DOES NOT ASSURE THEM THAT A SECOND-PHASE AGREEMENT WILL IN FACT BE CONCLUDED. IT REMAINS AN OPEN QUESTION AT THIS TIME WHETHER THE EAST CAN BE PERSUADED TO ACCEPT THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF PHASING. A BREAK-THROUGH ON THIS QUESTION WOULD REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT FORWARD STEP IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

65. I HAVE DESCRIBED THE Demeanor OF THE SOVIET AND OTHER WARSAW PACT DELEGATIONS AS CORDIAL AND BUSINESS-LIKE. ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE NOT REALLY MOVED FROM DEFENSE OF THEIR PROPOSAL, AND HAVE MADE NO SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS, I BELIEVE ONE CAN DETECT AN INTEREST IN SOME OF OUR CONCEPTS. I THINK THE SOVIETS HAVE A STAKE IN A SUCCESSFUL MBFR. IT CORRESPONDS TO, AND SUPPORTS, THEIR DETENTE POLICY. AN MBFR FAILURE WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH, AND HARMFUL TO, THIS POLICY. THEY HAVE EXPRESSED STRONG INTEREST IN LIMITING THE BUNDESWEHR OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AN INTEREST WHICH WE HOPE WE CAN EXPLOIT WITHOUT DETRIMENT TO ALLIED SECURITY. THEY APPEAR TO BE GENUINELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF A MORE INSTITUTIONALIZED WEST EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION- AND WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER THE IMPETUS WHICH A FAILURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD GIVE TO SUCH COOPERATION.

66. MR. CHAIRMAN, IT IS TOO EARLY TO PREDICT WITH ANY ASSURANCE WHAT THE OUTCOME OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE. THE EASTERN NEGOTIATORS ARE SERIOUS AND BUSINESS-LIKE IN THEIR APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY APPEAR GENUINELY INTERESTED IN LOOKING FOR COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS. BUT THEY ARE ALSO TOUGH NEGOTIATORS AND IT WILL TAKE A LOT OF PATIENCE AND PERSISTENCE ON THE PART OF THE WEST TO ARRIVE AT A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT.

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67. AS TO WHEN WE MAY EXPECT AN OUTCOME, YOU MAY RECALL BREZHNEV SUGGESTED PUBLICLY LAST FALL THAT REDUCTIONS COULD START IN 1975. THIS WOULD MEAN REACHING AN AGREEMENT THIS YEAR. THE EASTERN NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA HAVE SHOWN SOME INTEREST IN MAINTAINING THIS SCHEDULE. WE HAVE TOLD THE EASTERN SIDE WE THINK THAT IT WOULD BE FEASIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT IN 1974 AND BEGIN REDUCTIONS IN 1975, IF THE WESTERN TWO-PHASE APPROACH IS ADOPTED.

68. I MENTIONED EARLIER THAT WE ARE CURRENTLY CONDUCTING A SERIES OF INFORMAL SESSIONS WITH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES IN AN EFFORT TO ENGAGE THEM IN A MORE PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE ON SUBSTANCE. A PRIME WESTERN OBJECTIVE IN THESE SESSIONS IS TO PROBE EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO A TWO-PHASE APPROACH. WE HOPE WE CAN GET A BETTER ESTIMATE OF THEIR WILLINGNESS TO DO THIS BY THE EASTERN RECESS.

69. I THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN, FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO DESCRIBE OUR SITUATION HERE, AND WILL TRY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE. END TEXT.HUMES

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Message Attributes

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